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IMPACT OF THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ACT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS OF THE
MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
M. Jean McDevitt*
I. INTRODUCTION
Through the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act),' Congress has delegated to the Secre-
tary of Commerce the "broad authority to manage and conserve coastal
fisheries."2 The Magnuson-Stevens Act creates eight independent regional
fishery management councils to prepare fishery management plans for each
region.3 However, the regional councils do not have authority over all
species because the Magnuson-Stevens Act assigns responsibility to the
Secretary of Commerce for non-Pacific Ocean highly migratory species.4
Highly migratory species are defined under the Magnuson-Stevens Act to
include tuna species, marlin, ocean sharks, sailfishes, and swordfish.'
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2001.
1. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-83 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000). The Act was originally enacted
in 1976 and entitled the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The Sustainable
Fisheries Act of 1996 renamed the Act and made other substantive changes. Since its
original enactment, the policy focus of the Act has shifted from limiting foreign fishing to
regulating domestic fishing. JOSEPH J. KALO Er AL, COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 430-31
(1999).
2. Kramer v. Mosbacher, 878 F.2d 134, 135 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that statute pertain-
ing to implementation of fishery management plans, rather than statute pertaining to enforce-
ment of Magnuson-Stevens Act, applied to judicial review of Secretary of Commerce's
closure of South Atlantic King Mackerel fisheries).
3. Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1852(a)(1)(A)-(H) (West 1996 & Supp.
2000).
4. Id. §§ 1852(a)(3), 1854 (g).
5. Id. § 1802(20).
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In preparing and implementing all fishery management plans under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Secretary must consider factors that are aimed
at conserving and protecting the fishing industry, including minimizing the
disadvantage to domestic fishermen.6 Further, the Secretary must comply
with ten national standards, applicable to all fishery management plans
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, that require consideration of competing
environmental and economic concerns.7
The Secretary must also comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA),8 which was enacted to prevent the inequitable impact of agency
rules on small businesses.9 Small businesses tend to incur regulatory
compliance costs that are disproportionately higher than the costs associ-
ated with larger businesses for the same regulatory compliance.'" Under
the RFA, agencies are required to analyze their proposed rules and attempt
to reduce their impact on small businesses prior to passage of the rules."
The RFA requires agencies to prepare and publish in the Federal Register
an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) describing the effect of
a proposed rule on small businesses and discussing significant alternatives
that might minimize adverse economic consequences. 2 Publication of the
IRFA provides small businesses with an opportunity to publicly comment
on the analysis. If an agency decides that a significant impact on small
businesses likely exists, then the agency must explore alternatives to the
rule that would lessen the potential economic severity. However, if a
significant impact is not foreseeable, then the agency may issue the rule,
prepare a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA), and publish it in
the Federal Register.3 The agency may exempt itself from this process by
6. Id. § 1854(g)(1)(C).
7. Id. § 1851(a).
8. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-12 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000). The original RFA enacted in
1980 precluded judicial review of an agency's failure to comply with RFA requirements.
In 1996, the RFA was amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA), to provide for judicial review of the mandatory regulatory flexibility analysis.
As a result of the SBREFA, courts may provide judicial review of an agency's compliance
with the RFA.
9. Michelle Goldberg-Cahn, Note, Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley: A Balanced
Approach to Judicial Review Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 663,
664-65 (1999).
10. A "small business" is defined under the Small Business Act by the type of business
activity, size, number of employees, dollar volume of business, net worth, net income, and
any combination of those or other appropriate factors. 15 U.S.C.A. § 632(a) (West 1997).
II. Jennifer McCoid, Comment, EPA Rulemaking Under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act: The Need for Reform, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 203, 203 (1995).
12. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 603 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
13. Id. § 604(a).
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certifying that the final rule.will not "have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities."' 4
Both the RFA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act provide for judicial
review of the Secretary's regulatory actions pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA).'5 Agency actions under both the RFA and the
Magnuson-Stevens Act are to be reviewed for compliance in accordance
with the "arbitrary and capricious" standard under the APA. 6 The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held, under the RFA, that
judicial review should be a determination of whether the S6cretary em-
ployed a "reasonable, good-faith effort" in his consideration of alternative
regulation. 7 Essentially, a court reviewing an agency action under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard must determine whether the agency has
examined the pertinent evidence, considered the relevant factors, and
articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made by the agency."8
II. MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION
AND MANAGEMENT ACT
In response to increased demand on coastal fish stocks from foreign
fishing fleets, the United States Congress enacted the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act in 1976."9 The Act in its original form "asserted
14. d § 605(b).
15. Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(f); Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 611 (a)(1); Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C.A. §§ 701-06 (West Supp. 2000).
16. North Carolina Fisheries Ass'n v. Daley, 27 F.Supp.2d 650, 658 (E.D. Va. 1998).
A reviewing court shall "hold unlawful... agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A). A regulation is defeated upon APA review if "the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, [or] entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem." Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley,
995 F.Supp. 1411, 1425 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
17. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir. 1997). The
First Circuit analogized the RFA requirement to consider significant alternatives with the
National Environmental Policy Act and its requirement of preparing an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS). The EIS is meant to inform the public and the agency about
possible environmental effects and about potentially less harmful alternatives. The adequacy
of an EIS is likewise reviewed under a standard of reasonableness. Id.
18. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at
43.
19. KALO, supra note I, at 430.
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exclusive management authority over all marine life, other than birds,
marine mammals, and highly migratory species of tuna," within a 200 mile
exclusive fishery conservation zone.2' The Act's original emphasis on
requiring foreign fishing vessels to secure U.S. consent soon gave way to
new fish stock concerns as the domestic commercial fishing industry
boomed. It became evident that the provisions in the Act regarding
domestic, commercial, and recreational fishing were insufficient to
conserve the stressed fish stocks.2" As a result, the Act has been signifi-
cantly amended since 1976, with major substantive changes coming in the
form of the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 (SFA). 22 The 1996 SFA
renamed the legislation the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act.23
A primary purpose of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is the establishment
of Regional Fishery Management Councils to exercise sound judgment in
the stewardship of fishery resources through the preparation, monitoring,
and revision of Fishery Management Plans (FMP).24 The States, the fishing
industry, consumer and environmental organizations, and other interested
persons may participate in and advise on the establishment and administra-
tion of such plans, taking into account the social and economic needs of the
States.2' The Magnuson-Stevens Act ensures that the national fishery con-
servation and management program is responsive to the needs of interested
and affected States and citizens.26  To accomplish these goals, the
Magnuson-Stevens Act creates eight regional fishery management councils,
each having responsibility for creating FMPs to regulate commercial
fishing within its particular geographic region. In addition to the Regional
Fishery Management Councils, the Secretary of Commerce may also
prepare FMPs in certain circumstances.28
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 430-31.
23. Id. at 431.
24. Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(5) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1801(c)(3).
27. Id. § 1852.
28. Id. § 1854(c). If the Secretary determines that a fishery is overfished and the
responsible Regional Fishery Management Council, after notification by the Secretary fails
to develop and submit the required FMP to end the overfishing and rebuild the stocks, the
Secretary must prepare the FMP. Id. § 1854(e)(5). Also, if the Secretary disapproves all or
a portion of any FMP and the Council fails to submit a revised FMP then the Secretary must
prepare the revised FMP. Id. § 1854(e)(7). The Magnuson-Stevens Act gives exclusive
FMP and regulatory authority for Atlantic highly migratory species to the Secretary. Id. §
1854(g). Highly migratory species include tuna species, marlin, oceanic sharks, sailfishes,
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The Secretary must report annually to Congress and the Regional
Fishery Management Councils on the status of fisheries within each
geographical area.29 The Secretary must identify those fisheries that are
overfished or are approaching the condition of becoming overfished within
two years.30 Upon determining that a fishery is overfished, the Secretary
must notify the appropriate Council and request that it take action to end
overfishing in the fishery and implement conservation and management
measures to rebuild affected stocks of fish.3' Any resulting FMP, amend-
ment, or proposed regulation must specify the time period required to end
overfishing and to rebuild the fishery.32 That time period must be "as short
as possible, taking into account the status and biology of any overfished
stocks of fish, the needs of fishing communities, recommendations by
international organizations in which the United States participates, and the
interaction of the overfished stock of fish within the marine ecosys-
tem ....,3 Overfishing restrictions and recovery benefits must be fairly
and equitably allocated among sectors of the fishery.34 The Secretary must
review all FMPs, amendments, and regulations at routine intervals of not
more than two years.35 If the Secretary finds that an FMP, amendment, or
regulation has not resulted in adequate progress toward ending overfishing
and rebuilding affected fish stocks, the Secretary must either make immedi-
ate revisions necessary to achieve the required progress or notify the
appropriate Council to do the same.36
When an FMP is developed by a Regional Fishery -Management
Council, the Council prepares the FMP and submits it, together with any
proposed implementing regulations, to the Secretary for review.3' The
Secretary must then evaluate the FMP for consistency with ten national
standards 38 created by the Act, as well as any other applicable law.
39
and swordfish. Id. § 1802(20)
29. Id. § 1854 (e)(1).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 1854(e)(2).
32. Id. § 1854(e)(4).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 1854(e)(7).
36. Id.
37. Id. §§ 1852(h), 1853(c)(1).
38. The ten national standards provide general goals for the FMPs and regulations
created under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. These standards include: the prevention of
overfishing while achieving optimum yield of each fishery; the use of the best scientific
information available; a basis on which to allocate fishing privileges; and a provision that
conservation and management measures shall take into account the importance of fishery
resources to fishing communities, in order to provide for the sustained participation of such
20011
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Whether developed by a Regional Fishery Management Council or the
Secretary, all FMPs must be consistent with the ten national standards, any
regulations implementing recommendations by international organizations
in which the United States participates, and any other applicable law.4 The
Secretary must also evaluate all proposed regulations submitted by a
Council for consistency with the accompanying FMP.4 The Act requires
the Secretary to balance or consider the competing interests of promoting
the conservation of fish species and protecting the economic interests of
United States fishermen.42 All regulations proposed by both the Regional
Fishery Management Councils and the Secretary, once implemented, are
then subject to judicial review. 43 However, before a regulation may be
challenged in federal court, the administrative remedies must be fully
exhausted."
In addition to review of FMP regulations, judicial review is also
available for the Act's implementing actions, including fishery closures.4 5
Such challenges are limited to 30 days after publication of the regulation
or action. 4 ' The judicial review provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
provide that any such review is allowable "to the extent authorized by, and
in accordance with" the Administrative Procedures Act.47 The Secretary's
decision is not subject to de novo review.48 De novo is the process of
hearing a matter "as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision
had been previously rendered."49 Rather than hearing the matter anew, the
communities and minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities. Id. § 185 1(a).
39. Id. § 1854(a)(1)(A). The RFA is included in "any other applicable law." Id.
40. Id. § 1853(a)(1)(C).
41. Id. § 1854(b)(1). If the proposed regulation is approved by the Secretary, it must
then be published in the Federal Register. If the Secretary does not approve the regulation
then the Council has an opportunity to revise it and resubmit the revised regulation for
review. Id.
42. Id. §§ 1851(a), 1854(g).
43. Id. § 1855(0. This section provides: "Regulations promulgated... shall be subject
to judicial review to the extent authorized by, and in accordance with, chapter 7 of Title 5.
... Id. Title 5 refers to the Administrative Procedures Act.
44. Midwater Trawlers Co-op. v. Mosbacher, 727 F. Supp. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 1989)
(holding that judicial challenge to optimum yield cap set for ground fish fishery area was
barred by challenger's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies, where challenger failed
to file formal request with Secretary for amendment, and the Regional Fishery Management
Council made no recommendations).
45. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(b).
46. Id. § 1855(0(1).
47. ld.
48. Washington Crab Producers, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.
1990).
49. BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). The court hears the matter as a court
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court simply reviews the decision for reasonableness. A court will set aside
an FMP or regulation only where the record shows that the Secretary's
findings with regard to the challenged FMP or regulation were "arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise contrary to law."5
III. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
A. The RFA 's Legislative Purpose
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA),5" as originally enacted,
modified the federal executive agency rule-making process by requiring
agencies to analyze and seek to lessen the impact of any rules that federal
agencies promulgate on small businesses and other small entities.5 2
Congress found that federal agency regulations were applied uniformly to
small and large businesses, which Congress found to inhibit the develop-
ment of small businesses.53 Smaller entities are at a particular disadvantage
as their costs to comply with agency regulations are proportionately larger
than the costs incurred by large businesses because large businesses are
able to spread the cost of compliance over a larger output.5 4 In addition,
small businesses tend not to have the legal, economic, and technical
personnel or the resources necessary to comply with complicated regula-
of original jurisdiction rather than appellate jurisdiction. Id.
50. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997). See
also Parravano v. Babbitt, 861 F. Supp. 914, 921 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that the
Secretary's action may only invalidated if challenged action is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)
(1982)), aff'd 70 F.3d 539,548 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1016 (1996);
Alaska Factory Trawler Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating
that the Secretary's determination that the FMP did not violate the Act's national standards
or other applicable law could only be disturbed if such conclusion was arbitrary and
capricious or was an abuse of discretion); J.H. Miles & Co. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138,
1146 (E.D. Va. 1995) (findingjudicial review of agency decisions under Magnuson-Stevens
Act to be limited, therefore challenged regulations may be invalidated only if they are
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law).
51. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-12 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
52. McCoid, supra note 11, at 203.
53. Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory FlexibilityAct, 1982 DUKEL.J.
213, 221 (1982). Small business owners increasingly expressed their concerns that the
expansion of federal regulation was adversely affecting the economic prosperity of small
entities as a whole. Milton D. Stewart, The New Regulatory Flexibility Act, 67 A.B.A.J. 66,
66 (Jan. 1981).
54. Verkuil, supra note 53, at 221.
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tions.5 As a result, small businesses feel the fierce economic impact of
agency regulations, decreasing both competition and innovation. 6
The RFA was passed by Congress as an amendment to the APA.57 The
APA requires that federal agencies promulgate rational rules based on its
standard of disallowing rules that are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.58 The RFA is an analytical mechanism that agencies use to
reach a rational rulemaking decision.5 9 The RFA requires the agency to
undertake a cost-effective analysis in order to determine the least costly
method of achieving the statutory objective of the rulemaking agency.'
Without such an analysis, federal agencies often do not recognize the
impact that such regulations have on small businesses.6' In addition to
reducing the burden on small entities, two not-minor goals of the RFA are
to achieve the statutory mandate of the implementing agency at a lower cost
and allow the agencies to secure increased overall compliance. 6 Also of
significance is the RFA's overall goal of achieving greater communication
between small businesses and agencies through the rulemaking process. 6
3
55. Id.
56. McCoid, supra note 1 , at 204. This negative economic impact on small businesses
was particularly distressing in the 1980s. Small businesses generated thirty-nine percent of
the U.S. gross national product in 1981. Small businesses constituted the major source of
new jobs in the U.S. during the period 1988 to 1990. A sharp increase in the amount of
regulation during the 1990s has been claimed to hinder similar job growth during that
decade. Id. at 203-04.
57. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2000).
58. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
59. Barry A. Pineles, The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act: New
Options in Regulatory Relief 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 29, 30 (1997).
60. Verkuil, supra note 53, at 219.
61. Id. at 221-23.
62. Pineles, supra note 59, at 31. Rather than provide small businesses with an open
wide exemption from such regulations, Congress desired to make the RFA a process in
which the regulated entities would participate. Verkuil, supra note 53, at 223; see also Doris
S. Freedman et al., The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation to Small
Business, 93 DICK L. REV. 439,442 (1989).
63. Verkuil, supra note 53, at 229. In addition to the publication of notices and
summaries of analyses in the Federal Register, the RFA also requires agencies that are
promulgating rules to provide adequate notice directly to the affected small business entities,
also facilitating their meaningful participation in the rulemaking process. Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 609(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
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B. The RFA is a Procedural Statute
The RFA requires federal agencies to conduct thorough analyses of the
economic impact of a proposed rule or regulation on small entities.64 If the
agency determines that a potential significant impact on small entities
exists, it must explore alternatives to the regulatory proposal that would
minimize the significant economic and regulatory impact on small entities
while still accomplishing the stated objectives of the applicable statute.65
An agency may avoid performance of a regulatory flexibility analysis if the
agency head certifies that the rule or regulation, if promulgated, will not
"have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities."'
1. Certification
The basis of the certification process is that the participating agency
has performed some threshold analysis to determine the number of affected
small entities and the impact of the proposed rule or regulation on those
entities.67 However, the RFA does not establish standards for determining
how to define "a substantial number of small entities" or a "significant
economic impact."68 The Act does provide that "small business" and
''small entity" have the same meaning as "small business concern" used
under the Small Business Act. The RFA also provides, however, that an
agency may determine its own definition of a small entity.69 In their own
determinations of what constitutes a small entity, agencies take into
consideration whether a business is "independently owned and operated"
and whether a business is "not dominant in its field. 70
Because of the lack of clear standards, an agency should consider a
large number of factors before deciding whether a rule or regulation may
64. 5 U.S.C.A. § 603(a). Regardless of whether a rule or regulation impacts small
entities, agencies must supplement the usual notice of the proposed rule in the Federal
Register with a summary that describes any impact and lists significant alternatives to the
rule. Id. § 553.
65. Id. § 603(c).
66. Id. § 605(b).
67. Pineles, supra note 59, at 32.
68. 5 U.S.C.A. § 605(b) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
69. Id. § 601(3), (6). Establishing such a definition of small business or entity is done
after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and
after the definition has been published in the Federal Register with an appropriate time
period for public comment. Id.
70. Verkuil, supra note 53, at 233.
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be certified.71 During the course of a certification, the agency should first
ascertain the total number of businesses in the industry to be affected, the
total number of those businesses that come within the chosen definition of
a small entity, the number of those businesses that will be subject to the
proposed rule or regulation, the cost for an entity to implement the regula-
tion and the impact of those costs on the profits of a small business.72
Based on this analysis, the agency concludes whether the proposed rule or
regulation should be certified.73 If certified, then the agency must publish
the certification along with a summary explaining the reasons for the
certification in the Federal Register.74 However, if the agency's threshold
analysis finds that the proposed rule or regulation will have a significant
economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities, then the
agency must perform an initial regulatory flexibility analysis.75
I. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) describes the impact
of the proposed rule on small entities.76 The IRFA must also describe any
"significant alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated
objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any significant
economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities."77 The IRFA must
be published in the Federal Register.78
71. Pineles, supra note 59, at 32.
72. Id.
73. Id. The agency's self-analysis is particularly important because small entities are
at a disadvantage due to their lack of legislative sophistication as well as access to and
experience with statutes and regulations. Freedman, supra note 62, at 441.
74. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 605(b).
75. Id. § 603.
76. Id. § 603(b). Each IRFA must contain the following: (1) the reasons the agency is
taking the regulatory action; (2) a succinct statement of the objectives of and legal basis for
the proposed rule; (3) a description and estimate of the number of small businesses affected
by the rule; (4) a description of the anticipated reporting, recordkeeping, and other
compliance requirements with particularity to the affected small entities; and (5) any
duplicative, overlapping, or conflicting federal regulations. Id.
77. Id. § 603(c). Significant alternatives to be discussed include: "(I) the establish-
ment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account
the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification
of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the use
of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule
or any part thereof, for such small entities." Id.
78. Id.
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Publication of the IRFA has three primary objectives: (1) to notify the
affected industry and/or community of the potential impact of a proposed
rule or regulation;"9 (2) to provide the small entities with the information
necessary to allow their public comment on the proposal, including the
potential impact of the rule on them and other alternatives that the agency
may have underestimated; 0 and, (3) to increase communication between
the rulemaking agency and the effected small entities, pursuant to the
legislative purpose.8' Furthermore, publication of the IRFA provides for
the solicitation of public comment concerning the proposed rule or regula-
tion. 2
2. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Following the public comment period, the agency must prepare and
publish in the Federal Register a final regulatory flexibility analysis
(FRFA) which incorporates the public comment proceedings from the
IRFA.83 The purpose of the FRFA is to provide: (1) a succinct statement
of the need for and the objectives of the proposed rule; (2) a summary of
the issues raised by the public comments in response to the IRFA, a
summary of the agency's assessment of those issues, and a statement of any
changes made in the proposed rule resulting from those comments; and, (3)
a description of the significant alternatives to the rule and a statement of
reasoning as to why each of the alternatives was rejected by the agency.84
C. Judicial Review ofAgency Determinations in the 1980 RFA
The effect of the RFA's requirements on agency rulemaking has not
been as beneficial as anticipated by the United States Congress. The
failures of the RFA have stemmed largely from the inability of small
entities to challenge agency determinations and certifications that do not
comply with the RFA's requirements.8" The RFA, as originally enacted in
1980, specifically precluded judicial review of agency compliance. 6
79. Id.
80. Id. § 603(c).
81. Id. § 609.
82. Id. § 610(c).
83. Id. § 604(a).
84. Id.
85. Freedman, supra note 62, at 463.
86. 5 U.S.C.A. § 611(b). Congressional unwillingness to allow for judicial review of
2001]
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Additionally, courts have held that an agency's decision to perform a
certification rather than a full regulatory flexibility analysis is not judicially
reviewable and is, instead, solely at the discretion of the rulemaking
agency.87 In essence, an agency was able to completely avoid compliance
with the RFA simply by certifying that the Act would not have a "signifi-
cant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities" as a result
of the promulgation of the rule or regulation.8 Agencies ignored both "the
letter and the spirit of the RFA."89
This lack of a meaningful judicial review provision in the RFA meant
that compliance with the RFA was left to the individual agency head's
personal commitment to the goals of the RFA.9 Small business advocates
recognized that the threat of litigation and the application ofjudicial review
would be the best forces severe enough to persuade agencies to conduct
their decisionmaking processes in compliance with the RFA.9" Opposition
from federal agencies to amending the RFA was strong; essentially, they
based their resistance on the belief that a positive judicial review provision
would prevent an agency from adopting specific regulatory rules and
regulations.92 However, as discussed above, the RFA is a procedural statute
that allows an agency to follow any course of regulatory action that it
chooses, so long as the appropriate regulatory flexibility analyses as to the
impact on small business are performed.93
the substantive aspects of the agency decision-making evolved because of the desire to
protect such decision-makers from becoming burdened with excessive litigation. The entire
period of agency reform in the early 1980s was highly politicized and controversial, and
Congress did not want to add fuel to the fire. Goldberg-Cahn, supra note 9, at 673; see also
Howard M. Friedman, The Oversupply of Regulatory Reform: From Law to Politics in
Administrative Rulemaking, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1169, 1191 (1992).
87. Lehigh Valley Farmers v. Block, 640 F. Supp. 1497, 1520 (E.D. Pa. 1986); see also
Colorado State Banking Bd. v. RTC, 926 F.2d 931, 948 (10th Cir. 1991).
88. 5 U.S.C.A. § 605(b).
89. H.R. REP. No. 104-873, at 5.1 (1996) (West, WESTLAW through 2000 Sess.).
90. Pineles, supra note 59, at 37.
91. Id.
92 Id. at 38. Agencies also expressed apprehension about the courts fully compre-
hending the scientific and economic data that is included in a regulatory flexibility analysis.
Goldberg-Cahn, supra note 9, at 674-75.
93. Pineles, supra note 59, at 38.
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IV. SMALL BUSINESS REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT
FAIRNESS ACT OF 1996
In 1995, the House Committee on Small Business held two hearings
focusing on the past performance of the RFA and the need for meaningful
reform while strengthening the provisions of the RFA. 4 In response to
pressure from the small business community, Congress eventually passed
reforms to the RFA through the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA) as part of the Contract with America
Advancement Act of 1996."5 In approving the legislation, Congress made
a number of findings, including the importance of a growing small business
sector to the larger economic health of the nation and the fact that govern-
ment agencies had largely been ignoring the requirements of the RFA,
thereby placing greater regulatory burdens on small entities.96
Most importantly, the amendments to the RFA strengthened enforce-
ment by providing for judicial review of selected portions of the Act in
order to make agencies accountable for their lack of compliance with the
Act's required analyses.97 New Section 611 provides that "a small entity
that is adversely affected or aggrieved by final agency action is entitled to
judicial review of agency compliance with the requirements of [the
RFA]." '98 Judicial review is allowable in determining: (1) whether an
94. H.R. REP. No. 104-873, at 5.1.
95. See generally, Public Laws Enacted by the 104th Congress (1995-1996) (visited
Oct. 28, 2000) <http://rs6.loc.gov/law/usa/uslO4pl3.html>.
96. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
121, § 202, 110 Stat. 857, 857 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-612 (West 1996
& Supp. 2000). The specific purposes of the SBREFA were to:
(1) implement certain recommendations of the 1995 White House Conference on
Small Business regarding the development and enforcement of Federal regulations;
(2) provide for judicial review of chapter 6 of title 5 [RFA]; (3) encourage the
effective participation of small businesses in the Federal regulatory process; (4)
simplify the language of Federal regulations affecting small businesses; (5) develop
more accessible sources of information on regulatory and reporting requirements for
small businesses; (6) create a more cooperative regulatory environment among
agencies and small businesses that is less punitive and more solution-oriented; and (7)
make Federal regulators more accountable for their enforcement actions by providing
small entities with a meaningful opportunity for redress of excessive enforcement
activities.
Id. §203, 110 Stat. at 857-58.
97. H.R. REP. No. 104-873, at 5.1. The SBREFA also establishes a small business
advocacy review panel to provide small business participation in the rulemaking process.
Id.
98. 5 U.S.C.A. § 61 1(a)(1). The SBREFA also alters the requirements conc6ming the
preparation of the FRFA. Specifically, the analysis must now contain an estimate of the
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agency failed to follow the Act's definitions (e.g. the definition of a small
business);99 (2) whether the agency's certification that a rule does not
substantially impact small entities was appropriate;'0° (3) whether the
agency's FRFA met the statutory requirements;'0 ' and, (4) whether the
agency has met its obligation to periodically review rules to minimize the
effect on small entities. 102
Small entities may file complaints regarding an agency's analysis up to
one year after the agency publishes the final rule."0 3 The court has the
discretion to remand the rule to the agency for failure to comply with the
provisions of the RFA. 0 A reviewing court may delay enforcement of the
rule until the agency has performed the required analysis. 0 The enactment
of the SBREFA in 1996 essentially has placed the RFA in the position
which it should have taken at its original enactment in 1980. The legisla-
tive purpose of the original RFA was severely undercut by not including a
judicial review provision. With the amended RFA, it is up to the judicial
system to provide the proper interpretation of the judicial review process
and to demand agency compliance with the RFA.
V. SIGNIFICANT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley
In 1994, the New England Fishery Management Council responded to
the overfishing of cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder by recommending
certain amendments to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management
Plan.0 6 In turn, the Secretary of Commerce approved these amendments.1
0 7
number of small businesses that will be subject to a proposed regulation or the reasons why
the agency could not make that determination; the actual, legal, and policy reasons why the
agency could not take steps to minimize burdens on small entities; and the type of
professional skills need to comply with the reporting and recordkeeping requirements. Id.
§ 604(a)(3)-(5).
99. 5 U.S.C.A. § 611(a)(1) citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 601).
100. 5 U.S.C.A. § 61 1(a)(1) citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 605(b)).
101. 5 U.S.C.A. § 611 (a)(1) citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 604).
102. 5 U.S.C.A. § 609(a)(1).
103. Id. However, in challenging an agency action under the Magnuson- Stevens Act,
a complaint would have to be filed within thirty days of the publication of the final rule
because that Act is the governing statute. Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(0)(1)
(West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
104. 5 U.S.C.A. § 611(a)(4)(A).
105. Id. §611(a)(5).
106. Associated Fisheries of Maine, v. Daley, 954F. Supp. 383,385 (D.Me. 1997). The
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Associated Fisheries of Maine (Associated Fisheries) challenged Amend-
ments 5 and 7 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP.0 8 Associated Fisheries'
initial challenge was brought following the promulgation of Amendment
5; shortly thereafter, however, it was realized that haddock and yellowtail
stocks had collapsed, and cod stocks were near collapse. 09 The Secretary
ultimately responded to this information by promulgating Amendment 7.V
Associated Fisheries filed claims under the RFA, the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, and the APA, alleging that the FMP Amendments were disastrous for
small fishing boats and, in particular, the trawling industry in the
Northeast."'
1. Magnuson-Stevens Act
Associated Fisheries challenged the Amendments under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act on a number of issues, including: (1) the unreliability of the
science and the quantitative data that the Secretary used to determine the
depletion rates of the groundfish; (2) the economic analysis used to
establish that Amendment 7 would have a greater net benefit over Amend-
ment 5 during the next ten-year period; (3) the times of limitations selected
rather than other alternatives, for example: the Secretary's decision to use
day-at-sea limitations rather than closing certain areas to all boats; and, (4)
the fact that Amendment 7 was implemented before the effects of Amend-
ment 5 could be learned.12 The court applied a previously established
deferential standard of judicial review to find that the Secretary had neither
abused his discretion nor failed to follow the standards set by Congress.
11 3
New England Fishery Management Council has authority over commercial fishing in the
Atlantic Ocean off the coast of New England. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a)(1)(A). The Northeast
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan was created in 1985 as a result of the failure of
earlier, more lenient measures employed. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d
104, 107 (lst Cir. 1997).
107. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 385.
108. ld. Amendment 5, promulgated on March 1, 1994, was designed to avoid further
depletion of these groundfish stocks. Amendment 7, promulgated on May 31, 1996, was
designed to place even tighter restrictions on fishing vessels than those restrictions in
Amendment 5. By reducing the groundfish mortality rate to a low number, the stocks would
rebuild, rather than just maintain at an even, low amount. Id.
109. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d at 108.
110. Id.
111. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 385. Plaintiffs also




The Secretary of Commerce, in the exercise of her conservation and management
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The court found that the Secretary's conservative approach was definitely
appropriate considering the severely depleted state of the fishery and the
uncertainty of what effect the rebuilding measures would have on the
groundfish stocks." 4
2. RFA
Associated Fisheries asserted that the Secretary, through the National
Marine Fishery Service (NMFS), violated the RFA in promulgating
Amendment 7, because the Secretary failed to perform an adequate
FRFA. 5 In developing the FRFA, NMFS had combined its IRFA with the
public comment it had received in response. " 6 Associated Fisheries argued
that NMFS failed to comply with the requirement that the agency examine
the effect of Amendment 7 on small businesses," 7 and that it failed to
examine alternatives that would have reduced the burden on these small
entities. "'
From the administrative record, the court determined that the agency
had listed the comments received and its responses, as well as explanations
as to why alternatives that would reduce the burden on small entities were
rejected." 9 The court noted that although not every alternative was
considered by NMFS, the RFA requires only examination of "significant"
alternatives. 2° Despite noting that Amendment 7 would have a "regrettably
... harsh effect on the fishing industry, a significant means of support for
many coastal families and communities, and part of our social, cultural and
economic heritage.. ." the court found that the Secretary had acted within
his statutory mandate and had promulgated the Amendments according to
the procedures required by the applicable law.'
authority under the Act, has substantial discretion in selecting the appropriate quota
for a given fishery... A reviewing court may decide only whether this discretion was
exercised rationally and consistently with the standards set by Congress... and may
not substitute its own judgment as to values and priorities for that of the Secretary.
State of Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1052, 1055 (1st Cir. 1977).
114. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 390.
115. Id. at 386.
116. Id. at 386-87.




120. Id. Although the court stated that it was satisfied that NMFS had met its burden as
to this requirement, the court failed to distinguish between significant and non-significant
alternatives.
121. Id. at 391. Interestingly, following the court's analysis of the Secretary's and
NMFS's compliance with the RFA, the court concluded that judicial review was in fact
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3. On Appeal
On appeal to the First Circuit from the district court's grant of the
government's motion for summaryjudgment, Associated Fisheries renewed
its RFA and Magnuson-Stevens Act claims arguing that the impact from the
FMP Amendments would be devastating on the Northeast fishing
industry.'22 The First Circuit considered Associated Fisheries' argument
that the judicial review provision, as enacted under the SBREFA in 1996,
should have applied retroactively.12 3  However, the court ultimately
concluded that it was unnecessary to decide the question of retroactivity
because it could decide the case simply on the merits of Associated Fisher-
ies' arguments. 24
The First Circuit determined that the legislative purposes of the RFA-
to compel agencies to explain the basis for their actions and to ensure that
alternative proposals receive serious consideration-should be balanced
against the additional legislative goal that the RFA should not be used to
undermine other statutorily mandated goals." s Therefore, if the RFA were
used to escape the mandates of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, it would not be
fulfilling its additional legislative goal. 126 The court found that the Secre-
tary had made a reasonable, good-faith effort to carry out the mandates of
the RFA, recognizing that the Secretary was in the difficult position of
balancing the significant adverse impacts that Amendment 7 would have on
unavailable for the Amendments because they had been promulgated prior to the effective
date of the SBREFA. Id. at 387.
122. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d at 107-08 (1st Cir. 1997).
123. l at 112. Associated Fisheries argued on the basis of a Supreme Court decision,
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994), that a legislative package could be
separated and jurisdictional provisions, i.e. the judiciai review under the RFA pursuant to
the SBREFA, could be given retroactive effect, whereas substantive provisions may not be
given effect. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d at 112. Justice Homby, in
the federal district court in Maine, had refuted this argument stating that, "it would be
anomalous to apply the judicial review portion of the 1996 amendments to past agency
actions but at the same time not apply the substance of those amendments." ld. (citing
Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 954 F. Supp. at 387).
124. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d at 112-13. "[When an appeal
presents ajurisdictional riddle, yet the merits of the underlying issue are readily resolved in
favor of the party challenging jurisdiction, a court may sidestep the quanday and simply
dispose of the appeal on the merits." Id. (citing United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 715
(lstCir. 1996)).
125. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d at 114.
126. Is the court then saying that perhaps the NMFS did not satisfy their required
compliance under the RFA, but because the FMP amendments are severely needed in order
to cease overfishing and try to rebuild the stocks, then it is acceptable to skirt around
compliance?
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the industry against the severe depletion plaguing the fishery.127 Ulti-
mately, the court found that it was the Secretary's legal obligation to
develop an FMP to eliminate overfishing and that Amendment 7 was a
rational method of developing such a plan.' 2
4. Commentary
Following the appellate decision in Associated Fisheries of Maine,
government agencies had reason to be relieved. The court's decision in
Associated Fisheries of Maine was an indication of the effect that the
amended RFA would have on agency rulemaking. Agencies believed that
the First Circuit had struck an appropriate balance between its position as
reviewer and allowing adequate deference to agency rulemaking. 29 The
opinion's message and words are the same: an agency's good-faith effort
to satisfy the RFA requirements will also satisfy the courts, and they will
not engage in second-guessing an agency's decision. 130
B. Will Other Federal Courts Adhere to the First Circuit's Example?
Although Associated Fisheries of Maine appears to have a limiting
effect on the review of RFA agency compliance, some district courts have
been utilizing their judicial review power to examine the suitability of
agency certifications in avoiding regulatory flexibility analysis.' For
example, the Third Circuit engaged in a thorough analysis of the plaintiff's
claim that under the RFA, the EPA had improperly certified that a regula-
tory flexibility analysis was not necessary because there was no significant
impact on a substantial number of small entities. 1 32
127. Associated Fisheries of Maine v. Daley, 127 F.3d at 118.
128. Id.
129. Goldberg-Cahn, supra note 9, at 678.
130. Id. at 679. This decision should relieve agencies of their concern that the RFA will
be an averly burdensome mechanism and will result in endless scrutiny from the judiciary.
Id.
131. See infra Part V(C). In effect, because the First Circuit engaged in such an
extensive judicial review of NMFS's compliance under the RFA, the road has actually been
paved toward a thorough review even if the ultimate conclusion in Associated Fisheries of
Maine was to adhere to a good-faith, reasonability standard. Goldberg-Cahn, supra note 9,
at 679.
132. Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 122-23 (3rd Cir.
1997). The Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision in Associated Fisheries
of Maine, finding that retroactive application of the judicial review provisions enacted by
the SBREFA amendments was appropriate. However, because the complaining party failed
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit decided to challenge the Commerce
Secretary's allocation of groundfish catches off the Washington coast to
four Northwest Indian tribes.133 The plaintiff, Midwater Trawlers Coopera-
tive, argued that the Secretary's regulations, which implemented the
allocation, violated the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the RFA.'34 Midwater's
argument as to the RFA claim was essentially that, in the Secretary's
certification, that there was no significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, the Secretary had utilized the incorrect quantita-
tive measures to determine if small entities had been so severely impacted
as to require a regulatory flexibility analysis. 3 5 The court engaged in an
analysis to determine what figures were used by the Secretary and whether
the information needed in order to comply with the RFA could be gleaned
from that data.' 36 Ultimately, it was determined that the Secretary's basis
for the quantitative date was correct, and the court affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the claim. 1
31
C. Southern Offshore Fishing Association v. Daley
Domestic fishermen harvest, both recreationally and commercially, at
least 73 species of sharks found on the Atlantic coast, the Gulf of Mexico,
and the Caribbean Sea. 3 1 Shark fishing has increased in recent years as the
demand for shark products has risen in both domestic and international
markets.' 39 The United States government encouraged the fishing of
Atlantic sharks in the 1970s and 1980s because it was an underutilized
resource. " Shark fishing was also viewed as a means of alleviating fishing
pressure on other fish stocks.'4 ' Commercial fishermen commenced shark
to bring the claim of inadequate RFA compliance before the administrative body, the court
could not determine a holding on this issue. The court did not go into an in-depth discussion
of the RFA's applicability, however. Id at 118-23; see also Regulatory Flexibility Act 5
U.S.C.A. § 605.
133. Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1171. Midwater argued that the Secretary erred in considering the overall
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fishing as a result of the government's promotional efforts.' While some
fishing vessels harvest Atlantic sharks in addition to their harvest of other
Atlantic migratory species, some self-employed fishermen devote their
commercial fishing solely to the harvesting of Atlantic shark species.
14 3
Fishing boats primarily engaged in the shark fishery, having gear and crew
that are specialized for shark fishing, are known as "directed shark fishing
vessels."'"
A coalition of shark fishermen and shark fishing organizations com-
menced an action on May 12, 1997,' pursuant to the judicial review
provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 146 the RFA, 147 and the APA. 48
The Southern Offshore Fishing Association (Fishing Association) chal-
lenged the 1997 commercial harvest quotas for Atlantic large coastal
sharks, small coastal sharks, and pelagic sharks, as promulgated by the
Secretary through NMFS.149 NMFS had issued a proposed rule that would
reduce the 1997 large coastal shark quota by fifty percent. 50 NMFS also
requested comments on the proposed rule. 5 ' The proposal was based on
a Shark Evaluation Workshop Committee report which concluded that
overfishing was continuing the depletion of large coastal shark stocks.
52
NMFS certified that the quota reduction would not cause significant impact
on a substantial number of small businesses and thereby concluded that an
IRFA was not required under the RFA.'53 Despite receiving over 600
written comments in response to the proposed rule, NMFS proceeded to
promulgate the unchanged rule, issued an FRFA, and reiterated its conclu-
sion that the reduced commercial quota would not have a significant
impact. 154
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1415-16.
144. Id. at 1415.
145. Id.
146. Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(f) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
147. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 61 l(a)(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
148. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2) (West 1996).
149. Southern Offshore Fishing v. Daley, 995 F. Supp. at 1424.




154. Id. at 1423-24. Commercial fishermen submitted comments explaining their
dependence on sharks and the punitive effect that the quota would have on their livelihood.
The Small Business Administration (SBA), the RFA watch-dog, strongly criticized NMFS's
certification that there would be no significant impact. The SBA argued that the directed
shark fishermen's conversion to fishing other species would be costly and probably not
feasible. The SBA declared that it was clear that NMFS should have prepared an IRFA,
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In February 1998, the court entered an order upholding the reduced
quotas based on the scientific evidence, but held that NMFS's conclusion
that the quota reduction would have no significant economic effect on
commercial shark fishermen was arbitrary and capricious. 55 The Secre-
tary' s certification and FRFA were held to fail the APA standards and RFA
requirements. 5 6 The court remanded NMFS's RFA determinations to the
Secretary with instructions to rationally consider the economic effects and
potential alternatives to the 1997 quotas.5 7 It also retained jurisdiction
over the matter so as to review the economic analyses that the Secretary
would conduct pursuant to the court's order.58 The court maintained the
1997 Atlantic shark quotas pending further order of the court because of the
public interest in the fishery. 59
Between February 1998 and June 1999, NMFS made several submis-
sions to the court and the court issued orders, furthering good-faith
settlement negotiations. '"' The court reiterated on numerous occasions that,
during the remand period, the existing quotas would remain in effect
without any new regulations regarding catch quotas. 16 ' However, on June
3, 1999, the court was alerted that NMFS had promulgated new regulations,
effective July 1, 1999, that would again substantially reduce the Atlantic
shark quotas from the 1997 levels.'62 NMFS' s new regulations immediately
however, NMFS refused to comply. The FRFA that NMFS did prepare, entitled "Final
Environmental Assessment and Regulatory Impact Review/Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis," added little to their "no significant impact" certification. The court found the
FRFA to be a feigned attempt at good faith statutory compliance. Id. at 1434-36.
155. ld. at 1436-37.
156. Id. at 1436. The purpose of the FRFA is to summarize significant issues raised by
public comment in response to the IRFA and a summary of any changes made to the
proposed rule in response to the public comment. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 604(a)(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000). The court points out that NMFS could not possibly
have complied with Section 604 of the RFA because it could not summarize or comment on
an IRFA that it had never prepared. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 995 F. Supp.
at 1436.
157. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 995 F. Supp. at 1437.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1339-42 (M.D.
Fla. 1999). NMFS finally recognized that the 1997 quotas "may have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities." Id. at 1339.
161. Id. at 1342. The court issued an order on November 4, 1998 cautioning NMFS
specifically "against presuming that quota adjustments remain outside the realm of
permissible remedies available to the Court," putting NMFS on specific notice that the 1997
quotas were to remain in effect until the court reviewed the negotiations and assessed
NMFS's good faith conduct. Id at 1344.
162. d at 1342. NMFS also instituted new and much more restrictive fish management
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recognized that the quotas and other regulatory measures "may result in the
elimination of the directed shark fisheries for large coastal sharks, and may
substantially impact commercial fisheries for pelagic sharks and small
coastal sharks in the U.S. exclusive economic zone." 163 In response to the
"imminent violation" of the court's orders, the court entertained responses
showing cause why injunctive relief and fines should not be issued against
NMFS. 164
NMFS argued that its actions were consistent with the court's orders
because, following a report to Congress in October 1997 that shark stocks
were being overfished, NMFS was obligated under the Magnuson-Stevens
Act to design and implement new regulations to rebuild stocks. 65 Fishing
Association argued that NMFS had violated both the spirit and the letter of
the court's rulings by implementing the 1999 regulations.1 66 The court
agreed with Fishing Association that the 1999 regulations were in violation
of the court's orders. 167 NMFS should have informed the court of its
regulatory intentions and sought the court's leave to implement new quotas
rather than circumventing "the judicial process [to] achieve its desired
goals at the expense of justice and fair play."'' 68 The court also observed
that NMFS had recently exhibited similar conduct in other cases where the
agency pursued its objectives without recognizing applicable congressional
and judicial limitations. 69 The court enjoined the Secretary and NMFS
and fish-counting methods. Id.
163. 64 Fed. Reg. 29,090, 29,130 (1999).
164. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. Southern
Offshore Fishing Association also filed a new law suit which challenged the 1999
regulations. Id. at 1343.
165. Id. at 1343. The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that rebuilding plans be
developed within one year of identifying species as overfished. Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16
U.S.C.A. § 1854(e)(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
166. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1344-45. In North Carolina Fisheries Ass'n v. Daley, 27 F. Supp. 2d 650
(E.D.Va. 1998), the court held that NMFS failed to comply with RFA requirements when
it set the 1997 summer flounder fishery quota. The court found that NMFS acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in failing to make a good faith attempt at conducting the analysis mandated
by the RFA and Magnuson-Stevens Act. Id. at 666. The analysis that NMFS prepared
completely failed to consider the effect on fishing communities and small entities. Id. at 667.
The NMFS actions were solely in the interest of protecting the fish and they lacked
consideration of the fishermen, fishing communities, and small businesses, contrary to the
requirements of both the RFA and Magnuson-Stevens Act. Id. at 668. The regulations
would, in effect, devastate the flounder fishermen. Id. Similarly, the court in Atlantic Fish
Spotters v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. Mass. 1998), held that NMFS had acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in preparing regulations that banned the use of "spotter" aircraft to harvest
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from enforcing its 1999 regulations pertaining to the Atlantic shark
commercial catch quotas and fish-counting methods and maintained the
1997 quota levels. 7 '
The full impact of the RFA on the implementation and judicial review
provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act has yet to be determined because
the issues have not been fully litigated. Only two circuit courts have looked
at the amended RFA, and no circuit court decisions have been issued that
are directive in application of the RFA. 7 ' Some federal district courts
seem to be taking a hard-line approach in scrutinizing NMFS' s certification
procedure and regulatory analyses. 72 As the court noted in North Carolina
Fisheries Ass'n v. Daley,'73 the NMFS analysis was conducted as if the
economics of the reduced quotas would not affect actual fishermen. 174
Likewise, NMFS's stalwart position in Southern Offshore Fishing Ass 'n v.
Daley"7 5 indicated their unwillingness to recognize that their regulations
actually affected a large number of fishermen and their generally meager
Atlantic Bluefin Tuna. Id. at 118. Following the ruling by the federal district court, NMFS
promulgated new regulations with essentially the same effect as those rules that the court had
proscribed. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 n.4. Because
the rules were not yet final, the court in Atlantic Fish Spotters did not issue sanctions, but
it did announce that contempt proceedings would convene if, and when, the regulations
became final. Id.
170. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47. The court
noted that "setting aside the 1997 quotas in favor of earlier, less restrictive quota levels
would have the improper effect of punishing an incautious and perhaps overzealous
governmental agency at the expense of the public and the species." Id. at 1347.
171. The FirstCircuit's holding inAssociatedFisheries ofMaine v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104
(1st Cir. 1997) was issued under the original RFA, nonetheless, the court analyzed
compliance with the RFA finding that the Secretary followed the RFA requirements.
Golberg-Cahn, supra note 9. The First Circuit essentially gave great deference to the
rulemaking authority of NMFS, although it made a thorough review of the record, thus
accepting its role as to judicial review of the agency action. The Third Circuit has exercised
its judicial review under the RFA pursuant to action taken by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). Southwestern Penn. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106 (3rd Cir.
1997). Although the Third Circuit upheld the EPA's certification under the RFA because
the petitioner there failed to raise its argument in a timely manner, the court appeared to say
that it would have remanded the certification back to the EPA for further review. Id. at 118.
172. See, e.g., supra note 170; see also Northwest Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp.
2d 9 (D.D.C. 1998) (remanding RFA certification for further review because agency
certification was inappropriate due to the incorrect definition of "small entity"). But see
A.M.L. Int'l v. Daley, 107 F. Supp.2d 90, 105-06 (D. Mass. 2000) (finding that agency RFA
analysis met all the requirements of the RFA when it considered, yet rejected, at least twelve
significant alternatives to the proposed rule at issue).
173. North Carolina Fisheries Ass'n v. Daley, 27 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D.Va. 1998).
174. Id. at 667.
175. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
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livelihoods. 17 6 Thejudicial review provisions under the RFA mandate more
stringent application of the RFA's procedural requirements and small
businesses are increasingly challenging agency authority. However, from
the current state of litigation, it appears that the greatest effect of the RFA
will lie with the implementation provisions.
In April 1999, the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries for NMFS
testified before the House Committee on Resources regarding the imple-
mentation of the RFA. In her testimony, the Administrator recognized the
importance of the RFA in the agency's consideration of economic impacts
of conservation and management measures on small entities. 177 The
Administrator also described the impact that the RFA had imposed on
NMFS decisionmaking. Specifically, she stated that, through the process
of RFA analysis, certain management actions would be selected over
others, based on the receipt of comments after publication in the Federal
Register.7 1 Such explicit comments from NMFS indicate that the RFA is
having its desired impact of making agencies at least consider the economic
impacts of their actions on small entities. Perhaps the most that can be
gained from the RFA is a heightened awareness of and sensitivity to the
needs of small businesses engaged in industries such as fishing. From the
statements of the NMFS Administrator, it appears that some headway has
been made towards this pursuit.
The requirements of the RFA should not have a negative impact on the
effectiveness of the Magnuson-Stevens Act if NMFS is able to discern from
judicial review exactly what is expected of the agency and how best the
agency may comply with judicial determinations. The current period of
testing by NMFS is to be expected in response to the amended RFA, and
it is necessary for NMFS to establish how much deference will be extended
to its decisions. This is not to say that NMFS's discretion will not, or
should not, change in response to the amended RFA. Rather, the amended
RFA was enacted in response to concerns from small businesses that their
existence was jeopardized by overzealous agencies and regulations with
which the small businesses could not feasibly comply. Because of the RFA
requirements, agencies are more likely to listen to comments from small
businesses. The judicial review provisions safeguard the period of notice
176. Id. at 1340.
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and comment by reviewing agency certifications under the arbitrary and
capricious standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
The requirements of the RFA will force NMFS to at least acknowledge
and consider the potential devastation that severe regulations may have on
fishing communities and their small businesses. Following the procedures
of issuing an IRFA, FRFA, and review of comments, NMFS may then
promulgate a rule if the agency continues to find the regulation necessary
to fulfill its mandate under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Essentially, the
RFA requirements and judicial review provisions prevent agencies from
skirting the analysis process by simply certifying that the final rule will not
"have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.""17 The RFA could prove to be a helpful balancing mechanism to
the Magnuson-Stevens Act as the sustainability of the fishing industry is
challenged by the increasing scarcity of resources.
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